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Undue Pressure or Moral Obligation: Religious Gifting and Undue Influence
Introduction
Adults at risk (discussed below) can suffer abuse, the main perpetrators are often understood to be 
their family, friends and/or carers. However, charities, including religious institutions, have the 
potential to exploit this group of people. Hedlund (2016: p. 299) argues that ‘… religious institutions 
are particularly vulnerable to being found liable for undue influence because of the psychological 
impact that religious devotion can have on people. As such, special care must be taken when religious 
institutions ask for and accept gifts and donations’. 
This paper will consider the relationship between gifting to religious institutions and undue influence. 
It will consider free will and autonomy and how that relates to adults at risk. Reasons for gifting during 
a person’s lifetime (inter vivos gifting), and how this correlates with undue influence will be explored. 
It will also highlight potential safeguards that can be considered to protect those who gift (donor) as 
well as the institutions receiving such gifts (donee). There is a fine line between undue influence and 
feeling morally obligated to donate. We need to understand where the line is if we are going to protect 
both parties to the transaction. Many of the concepts discussed within this paper has broader 
application, however, religious institutions provide an example of how gifting and undue influence 
relate to one another.
What is evident is that prior to gifting, a discussion between a donor and an independent third party 
would be beneficial. In addition, religious institutions should continue to be proactive in protecting 
donors to safeguard their own position. For those institutions that do not have a policy or charter in 
place governing how gifts are accepted,  accountability could come in the form of a compulsory charter 
created by the Charity Commission, an organisation established by s 6 Charities Act 2006 to oversee 
the activities of charities.
Adults at Risk and Free Will 
Adults at Risk
In order to provide context to the discussion in this paper it would be prudent to first set out the 
definition of an adult at risk. This would be particularly beneficial to understand why this group would 
be open to abuse by religious institutions, and therefore why both parties to the transaction may need 
to be alert to undue influence. Firstly, it should be noted that although the term is applicable to a wide 
variety of circumstances, in this context, the paper considers adults at risk from the perspective of 
adult safeguarding in England.
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In accordance with s 42 Care Act 2014, an adult at risk is one who is ‘experiencing, or at risk of, abuse 
or neglect, and as a result … is unable to protect himself … against the abuse or neglect or the risk of 
it’. Abuse in this context includes ‘being put under pressure in relation to money …’ (s 43(3)(c) Care 
Act 2014). 
Previously, such adults were considered as vulnerable. In fact, the courts continue to have an inherent 
jurisdiction to protect adults (with mental capacity) who they believe are vulnerable and where the 
law does not provide for a remedy. An in-depth discussion of the differences between the terminology 
is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is noted that vulnerability, as referred to by Pritchard-
Jones (2018), relates to an internal characteristic together with abuse. The notion of a vulnerable adult 
was criticised for reinforcing the stigma attached to having an impairment, and as a result, suffering 
abuse (Pritchard-Jones, 2018). Pritchard-Jones (2018: p. 54) argues that the term ‘at risk’ continues to 
invoke ‘…the idea that the inability to protect oneself from abuse [is] because of a need, which is 
generated by an impairment or a disability…’ and therefore blames the individual for having suffered 
the abuse.
Free Will and Capacity
Rousseau (2016: p. 211) suggests that free will is ‘… an individual’s capacity to make choices without 
certain constraints: physical (imprisonment), social (threats or manipulation) or personal (mental 
illness)’. She goes on to state that ‘Free will is both an individual and a social construction, born out of 
how the brain talks to itself and the expectations and opportunities human communities convey to 
their members. A belief in free will affects not only individual behavior but also its persistence, through 
the level of commitment individuals have to a course of action they have chosen (Salancik and Pfeffer, 
1978)’ (Rousseau, 2016: p. 212). 
Based on the Department of Health (2008b) Safeguarding adults report Pritchard-Jones (2018: p. 53) 
suggests that ‘Adults with capacity, however, do have a fundamental right to choose their own actions 
and their own safeguarding plans, though they may need to be assisted and empowered to make their 
own informed choices’. 
It was also suggested by Rosseau (2016) that how information is presented to an individual affects the 
use of their free will. Where there are options, it can demonstrate that the individual has exercised 
free will. This is somewhat aligned to the argument above, which suggests that adults at risk should 
be supported in making their own choices.
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The ability to make informed choices is perhaps synonymous with mental capacity. In England there 
is no single test for assessing an individual’s mental capacity for every type of decision. Instead there 
are various common law tests, depending on the decision that needs to be made. For inter vivos gifts 
the common law test can be found in the case of Re Beaney [1978]. In this case medical evidence 
suggested that the mother was suffering from senile dementia, which had progressed to an advanced 
stage. However, those present at the signing of the transfer of her property suggested that when 
asked whether she understood what she was doing, the mother had responded positively and that 
she signed the document with ease. The court held that the mother did not in fact understand the 
consequences of her actions. The court also stated that the degree to which a person must understand 
their actions depends on the circumstances. Therefore, where the decision is trivial the degree of 
understanding would be lower than if the transaction were of greater value. In addition, the court 
highlighted that ‘…since the claims of the [children] and the extent of the property to be disposed of 
were not explained to the deceased, the transfer was void even if she did understand that she was 
making an absolute gift of the house…’ (Re Beaney, [1978]: p. 771). 
When discussing mental capacity, it would also be prudent to consider both cognitive and situational 
capacity as they too relate to an individual’s capacity to make informed choices.  Cognitive capacity 
relates to the ability of an individual to make decisions, despite suffering from an impairment of the 
mind or brain. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 which provides the legal framework for decision making 
for or on behalf of those who lack mental capacity provides a line beyond which an individual should 
be assisted to make decisions. The Law Commission (2017: p. 18) confirmed that, ‘… the law sets a 
threshold for when the degree of the disorder, illness or impairment renders a person incapable to do 
the act or make the decision’. In these circumstances an individual ought to be supported to make 
decisions and be given the opportunity to understand the consequences of the same. 
Situational capacity is where the court’s inherent jurisdiction is invoked to fill the gaps left by statute. 
The court will use its inherent jurisdiction when an individual is ‘i) Under constraint; or ii) Subject to 
coercion or undue influence; or iii) For some other reason deprived of the capacity to make the 
relevant decision or disabled from making a free choice, or incapacitated or disabled from giving or 
expressing a real and genuine consent’ (DL v A Local Authority & Others, [2011]: 22). This would 
require an application to be made to the court for a declaration (before the transaction took place) 
that the individual had the capacity to make such a decision. Alternatively, the application to the court 
would be made after the transaction had taken place, to put right the wrong that had occurred. In this 
instance it would not prevent undue influence from taking place but reverse the effect of it.
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It is therefore clear that adults at risk need to be supported to make informed decisions. However, 
what is unclear is the point at which an individual would need to be assessed as needing support. The  
Law Commission (2017), when discussing capacity to make a will, suggested that the general 
consensus is that lawyers or medics may be best placed to make such an assessment, but that the key 
consideration should be a long standing professional relationship with the individual rather than a 
single, one off meeting. It is presumed that a third party would only step in if there were concerns as 
to the individual’s capacity to make a decision. It is also more likely that the individual would have a 
longstanding relationship with their religious institution (albeit this would be a non-professional 
relationship) as opposed to their lawyer or doctor (in terms of assessing risk). Should this be the case, 
even with policies in place, religious institutions may feel uncomfortable in making an assessment, 
particularly where their decision may later be challenged in court or where a conflict of interest may 
arise.
Rationale for Religious Gifting
Attitudes
There are various factors which influence an individual’s reasons for gifting to a religious institution. 
For example, Lincoln et al (2008) argue that attendance and commitment are more likely to indicate 
that the individual will gift to the religious organisation. It is suggested that this may no longer be a 
significant factor particularly so during the Covid-19 pandemic where religious institutions were not 
accessible. In accordance with Government guidance (2020), from 2 December 2020, based on the 
Tier system to prevent the spread of Covid-19, it is illegal for those in Tier 1 to meet in groups of more 
than six indoors or outdoors, including places of worship. There are further restrictions for those in 
Tiers 2 and 3, which make it difficult for groups to congregate to worship together (correct at time of 
writing).
Furthermore, Lincoln et al’s literature review of 2008 highlights that studies have shown that the more 
conservative, as opposed to liberal, your religious views are, the more likely you are to give and the 
more you would give. This seems to suggest that those who donate on this basis have preconceived 
ideas about gifting, and that they cannot be easily influenced either way. It was also suggested that 
reciprocity may be a better indicator of giving, the idea being that the more you get back from your 
religious institution the more likely you are to invest in it. This reflects a balanced approach to gifting 
whereby an individual can rationally consider what is in their best interests given their financial means 
and whether they should be gifting, and if so the extent of such a gift. 
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Peifer (2010: p. 1570) stated that ‘both the sense of community felt by individuals and the religious 
meaning of individuals induce religious giving’. He highlights various reasons as to why an individual 
may donate, such as the size of the congregation, suggesting that the more exclusive or strict the 
congregation is the more generously individuals’ gift.  For strict churches, who require the worshipper 
to follow a particular way of a life, or dress code, it is suggested that ‘free riders’ are eliminated and 
therefore only those fully committed remain and are more likely to give more generously (Peifer, 2010 
referring to Iannaccone’s strictness hypothesis). 
When discussing the amount one gives, Peifer (2010: p. 1572) suggests that ‘Generally speaking, 
religious values instruct one to give more while economic motives lead one to give less’. This therefore 
requires the individual to understand the extent of the gifting, in comparison to their means. Peifer 
provides several hypotheses for why an individual would gift more or less, the discussion is beyond 
the scope of this paper. However, it is interesting to note that the notion of reciprocity, as referred to 
above seems to suggest greater donation.
Obligations to Give
One way an individual may feel obligated to gift is by way of a tithe. Budiselic (2014) suggests that 
there are several definitions of what a tithe is, how it is paid and to whom it must be paid to. This 
paper will take the view that a tithe is an obligation to give to the church. The purpose of the tithe 
being to support the local religious organisation and the work undertaken by it in the local community. 
Budiselic also suggests that the rationale for the tithe is as a result of charitable giving, and to support 
those less well off. However, Nelson argues that ‘People feel condemned, guilty of robbing God if they 
don’t give the tithe and beyond. Many feel that their relationship with the Lord is in jeopardy and that 
His favor will depart if they don’t give’ (Budiselic, 2014: p. 152).  This is supported by Keeton and 
Gowertt (1934: p. 338) who argue that there was a time when ‘…the jurisdiction over wills of 
personalty had passed to the ecclesiastical courts and so testators wishing for safe passage to heaven 
were likely to leave a one third share of their personal belongings to the church.  This viewpoint, it is 
suggested, is an archaic interpretation of the tithe within the Old Testament. Sherwin (2016), in his 
blog, highlights his interpretation of giving within the New Testament. In particular, he sets out that 
one ought to
1. ‘Give out what you do have, not out of what you don’t. 
2. Give willingly, not under pressure.
3. You must each make your own mind up about how much to give’.
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Moretsi (2009) suggests that the New Testament provides principles that should be followed, rather 
than a specific amount that must be given. These principles include; gifting should be a ‘free and 
spontaneous act; that it should be balanced between the individuals means and the needs of others; 
that gifting is a demonstration of faith and that the more generously you give the more God will give 
back to you; that there should be mutual appreciation of the gift; and that gifting reflects Jesus’ 
example of giving to the needy and poor (Moretsi, 2009: p. 406).
Of course, there are likely to be those traditionalists who continue to believe in a monetary 
requirement to tithe (Croteau, 2005) because that is the way it has always been done in their church, 
or those who preach the tithe in terms of pragmatism. Croteau (2005) suggests that this is where 
church attenders are encouraged to gift a percentage of their income as it is easier to explain than 
attempt to understand the complexity of how the tithe should be applied. 
In the Muslim faith the equivalent of the tithe is the zakat. This is said to be the concept of 
‘redistribution of wealth prescribed by God to the deserving category of people’ (Rahim and Kasawadi, 
2014). The calculation of the zakat appears to be more rigid than the tithe, although it seems to be 
applied differently amongst different countries. In accordance with the National Zakat Foundation in 
the UK the zakat is a ‘core obligation that requires Muslims to make an annual payment of 2.5% of 
their qualifying wealth’ (National Zakat Foundation, 2020). Rahim and Kasawadi (2014: p. 54) suggest 
that the zakat is both a spiritual duty  and a compulsory gift to be given by every Muslim, and that 
‘whoever pays the zakat on his wealth will have its evil removed from him’. It is argued that any 
reference to the act of giving as being compulsory, or relating it to evil, takes away free choice and 
raises the presumption of undue influence. 
The dana on the other hand, which relates to Hinduism and Buddhism is a much more fluid notion. 
The emphasis is much more on giving without expectation and that it should be spontaneous and 
anonymous (Eck, 2013). Unlike the zakat it does not appear to be as prescriptive and seems to suggest 
more free will. However, monetary gifts can be significant, and it is unclear how such faiths ensure 
that their followers are safeguarded generally, and more specifically in relation to undue influence.
Many faith groups instil moral obligations upon their followers to give to their faith. There is therefore 
an uncomfortable dichotomy between faith and the law on undue influence in England and Wales. By 
suggesting or claiming that such gifting is a compulsory act, or that by not giving the individual will 
suffer in any way, it is contended that this raises the presumption of undue influence. 
Undue Influence 
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Where a gift is made inter vivos there are two ways in which undue influence will arise. Firstly, by way 
of actual undue influence. This relates to improper pressure that was applied to an individual by 
another (Ridge, 2004). Barclays Bank v O’Brien [1993] confirmed this as the requirement of proof that 
exertion was applied. The case also confirmed the second method by which undue influence would 
be present, and this is by way of a presumption. This relies on there being a relationship of trust and 
confidence and where it is fair to presume that there was an abuse of this relationship (Melling and 
Pagni, 2001). The presumption of undue influence will automatically arise due to the existence of this 
relationship. Where such a relationship exists, the burden of proof shifts from the donor to the donee 
to demonstrate that they acted in good faith in receiving the gift and had not unduly influenced the 
donor. Ridge (2004) suggests that presumed undue influence is where there is a strong relationship of 
trust and confidence where one party has a significant influence on the decision making powers of the 
other, and where the action by the donee cannot be easily explained. Furthermore, there are two 
ways in which this relationship can arise the first being as a matter of law. The second being a 
relationship which generally reposes trust and confidence, such as a spiritual advisor and follower 
(Ridge, 2004; Melling and Pagni, 2001). It was stated by Jarboe (1991: p. 274) that the donee ‘… must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised his own good faith in the transaction and 
must show the grantor’s free, voluntary, and intelligent ie. informed action’. 
In relation to spiritual advisors, it was stated in Nottidge v Prince [1860] that ‘no person who stands 
in a relation of spiritual confidence to another so as to acquire a habitual influence over his mind can 
accept a gift or benefit from the person who is under the dominion of that influence, without the 
danger of having the gift set aside’ (Winder, 1939: p. 101). This notion could be applied to regular 
requests to donate at weekly services, whereby the religious institutions arguably obtain a habitual 
influence over the donor’s mind. However, there would also need to be a less plausible reason to 
make such a donation. Arguably, donations at weekly services would be minimal and potentially more 
proportionate to one’s financial means, however, as Peifer (2010: p. 1574) suggests ‘religious gifting 
[could be] driven by the social monitoring of other congregational actors’ which influences the amount 
donated and which could be more than the donor could afford to give.
It could be argued that those likely to question a donation would be close relatives or friends, who 
may also have the same beliefs and are therefore unlikely to consider that there is a dominion over 
the donor. It is also difficult to define when pressure and persuasion becomes coercion. This is 
highlighted by the Law Commission (2017: p. 137), who stated that ‘The line between legitimate 
persuasion and undue influence is not always clear. There is a wide spectrum between egregious 
instances of undue influence and the innocent appeals of relatives seeking to curry favour with the 
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testator. The line is crossed when the testator would say “this is not my wish, but I must do it”’. So as 
to ensure that not every donation is brought to question, Lindley LJ suggested in obiter that the gift 
made needs to be ‘… so large as not to be reasonably accounted for on the ground of friendship, 
charity, or other ordinary motives on which ordinary men act’ (Allcard v Skinner  [1887]: 185). Having 
considered the principles of giving above, it is suggested that if there is an obligation to gift this could 
fall within this category and therefore be considered as having raised the presumption of undue 
influence. However, the donation would need to be disproportionate to the donor’s financial means 
for it to be fully explored as such.
Various factors may deter someone from making a claim that undue influence has taken place. Firstly, 
by suggesting that undue influence is in existence, they will in effect be accusing someone of immoral 
behaviour. They may be reluctant to do this, particularly if it is a religious institution that they support, 
and where the community will frown upon such challenges. Furthermore, if they bring an unsuccessful 
claim, they may be ordered to pay costs, which can be quite high (Parry and Kerridge, 2016). It could 
also be argued that the courts do not encourage such a claim, as per Sir Gorell Barnes’ obiter 
comments in Spiers v English [1907] where he stated that undue influence ‘ought never to be put 
forward unless the party who pleads it has reasonable grounds upon which to support it’(para. 124). 
This almost seems to suggest that only where you have clear evidence of coercion should you make a 
claim, as otherwise it is unlikely to be successful. This is supported by comments made by Lewison J 
in Edwards v Edwards [2007] where he referred to a ‘… high burden … that the claimant bears in 
proving undue influence’ (para. 47).  Bigwood (2002) explains the difficulties in proving undue 
influence in two stages; firstly, is the opportunity to pursue a personal interest too far removed from 
the donee’s responsibilities towards the donor (and therefore the relationship of trust and confidence 
does not arise); and secondly, is there enough incentive for the donee to impose any influence 
(suggesting that the lower the value of the gift, the less incentive there would be to unduly influence)? 
In light of the above discussion, it appears that in a relationship between a spiritual advisor and 
follower there would be a relationship of influence, however, unless the gift is ‘large’ or 
disproportionate to the donor’s financial means it would not raise any suspicion.
 Possible Solutions
Certification
In accordance with the case of Kenward v Adams [1975], where a solicitor taking instructions from a 
client in respect of their will, is unsure as to whether the individual has mental capacity to provide 
such instructions they should adopt the Golden Rule by way of best practice. The case specifically 
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refers to testators (those making the will) who are aged or seriously ill, and suggests that where this 
is the case, then their will should be witnessed or approved by a medical practitioner who ought to 
record their examination of the testator and their findings. Ultimately, lawyers should seek 
confirmation from a medical practitioner that their client has the mental capacity to prepare and sign 
the will. What is being sought is confirmation that the testator understands the nature and effect of 
creating the will; that they understand the claims that may arise as a consequence of preparing their 
will in that manner; that they understand the size and extent of the assets that they are able to 
distribute under their will; and that they are not suffering from an impairment of the mind or brain 
(Banks v Goodfellow [1870]). The case of Custard v Templeman [2020] affirmed that the principle is 
not a rule of law, but merely guidance to avoiding litigation or disputes. 
The case of Etridge [2001], which related to a wife acting as a guarantor for her husband, considered 
the issue of undue influence, and although it acknowledged that this could not be prevented, it 
suggested that some level of protection would be desirable. In particular, the principle drawn from 
this case was that where a bank is put on enquiry, they would be required to take reasonable steps to 
ensure that the guarantor understands the risk of acting as such (including the extent of their liability) 
and that they take independent legal advice before acting in that capacity. A bank would be put on 
enquiry in every case where the relationship between the guarantor and debtor is non-commercial. If 
banks do not follow this guidance, they run the risk of not being able to enforce their security. 
It is therefore suggested that religious institutions should be put on notice where an adult at risk is 
gifting, and in such instances encourage the adult at risk to seek independent legal advice. Such advice 
would then be recorded in a form of certificate to be retained by the donee. This would support an 
adult at risk to make an informed decision, as a lawyer could provide a clear explanation of the nature 
and extent of the gift being made, as well as the consequences. However, it is acknowledged that the 
Golden Rule only applies to gifts made in a will (testamentary gifting) and that neither the Golden Rule 
nor the principle in Etridge would prevent undue influence from occurring.  Of course, as stated 
previously, the starting point is that a person is free to make their own decisions, even if unwise and 
so having explained the nature of their actions, and so forth, the donor is entirely free to decide to 
continue.  The difficulty in providing a certificate would be in the assessment of whether undue 
influence is present. It is argued that a single, one off meeting with a lawyer would not enable 
detection of such influence. Although it may provide the donor with an opportunity to discuss any 
coercion it is unlikely that they would be so candid with a stranger. 
Furthermore, there is a cost attached to obtaining legal and medical opinion. The donor is likely to 
undertake a cost/benefit analysis of whether to seek such opinion to protect their gift. The assumption 
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therefore is that if the donor believes the gift to be small (a subjective interpretation) no such opinion 
would be sought. In addition, the definition of an adult at risk includes a person who cannot protect 
themselves. As such they may not be aware that they require assistance in making a decision and 
therefore not seek the relevant advice.
It is envisaged that such certification would be of benefit for very large gifts, which appear to be 
disproportionate to the donor’s financial means and where perhaps a challenge to such a gift is 
anticipated. It could be that religious institutions include a requirement within their policies for adults 
at risk to seek independent legal advice where the donation being made is large. This may not prevent 
a challenge of undue influence; however, it would provide the donor with some level of protection. 
Accountability 
Upon searching the Charity Commission website for places of worship, there were approximately 
107,406 registered charities which contained one of the following words: church, synagogue, mandir 
or mosque (as at 17 April 2020). This is only a rough estimation, and closer scrutiny of the register 
would be required to ascertain the exact number of religious institutions that are registered as a 
charity. Nevertheless, it does provide a guide as to the number of regulated charities in existence who 
would be subject to the Charity Commission regulations and guidance.
It should be noted that registration with the Charity Commission is not required in all circumstances. 
However, where the organisation is in receipt of an annual income of more than £5,000 per annum, 
they would be required to register with them, and this would include places of worship that exceed 
this threshold. It is argued that there is a lack of guidance by the Charity Commission aimed specifically 
at religious institutions and how to prevent undue influence.
In addition to guidance provided by the Charity Commission, charities may also voluntarily adopt the 
Code of Fundraising Practice created by the Fundraising Regulator. The Regulator is an independent 
third party who oversees fundraising by registered and non-registered charities as well as 
organisations that are not overseen by the Charity Commission. It should be noted that this is a 
voluntary scheme, and organisations who fundraise are not required to adopt it. Nevertheless, it is 
suggested that by way of best practice, this could be a form of regulation which would make religious 
institutions accountable for their actions towards raising donations.
There are several instances within the Code of Practice where guidance is provided on how fundraisers 
can protect themselves from being accused of having unduly influenced a donor. For example, ‘1.2.1 
[states that] While reasonable persuasion is allowed you must not fundraise in a way which …, is 
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unreasonably persistent or places undue pressure on a person to donate’ (Fundraising Regulator, 
2019: p. 11). In addition, section 8.1.1 of the Code states that, the fundraiser must not act dishonestly, 
manipulatively or make the donor feel guilty if they chose not to donate (Fundraising Regulator, 2019).
Much of the guidance provided to charities and fundraisers focus on language relevant to undue 
influence. However, definitions or case studies are not provided, and institutions are left to their own 
imaginations as to what would constitute reasonable or unreasonable. It is therefore suggested that 
such Codes of Practice and guidance provided to institutions be made clearer.
Individual religious institutions are also welcomed to create their own codes of practice. For example, 
The Church of England have created the Parish Safeguarding Handbook to ensure that safeguarding 
policies are implemented, maintained and investigated where necessary. Unlike generic safeguards 
referred to above, this handbook specifically acknowledges that ‘workers in places of worship’ (Church 
of England, 2018) are amongst those who could abuse adults. It suggests that ‘…some adults may not 
consider themselves vulnerable but may be vulnerable to being abused by individuals in positions of 
leadership and responsibility’ (Church of England, 2018: p. 54). It highlights that abuse comes in many 
different forms, and can include coercion under psychological abuse (Church of England, 2018) 
although it does not specifically link such abuse being instigated by the worker, which it is argued it 
perhaps should.
Another example of self-regulation and accountability can be seen from the National Catholic 
Development Conference Inc. The organisation is US based, and it is less stringent than The Church of 
England guidance. The guidance sets out that ‘the donor has the privilege of deciding his or her own 
reasons and purpose for the first, whether the gift is modest or large’ (National Catholic Development 
Conference Inc, 2008: p. 11). However, for larger gifts there is the suggestion that the donor submits 
a proposal in the first instance for consideration. If the proposal is then accepted, an 
acknowledgement letter should be sent once the donation has been received and for more complex 
cases an agreement should be created, much like a contract (National Catholic Development 
Conference Inc, 2008). This latter suggestion would perhaps force the donor to seek independent legal 
advice before entering into such an agreement, as referred to in the previous section. 
In terms of accountability it is perhaps prudent to create a single source which is applicable to all 
religious institutions. Currently, each institution is left to determine what safeguarding policies they 
put in place, and this therefore has the potential to create inconsistencies. As a starting point the 
Charity Commission could create a set of compulsory rules to ensure that religious institutions follow 
the same steps to ensure that donors are not gifting for reasons related to undue influence. It appears 
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that the only way that this can be done is to ensure that donors seek independent legal advice. This 
would be more appropriate for large donations (which would need to be defined). It may be 
disproportionate to regulate small regular donations, but instead include safeguarding policies were 
workers within a place of worship are vigilant as to the individual’s circumstances and raises suspicion 
where appropriate. 
Conclusion
There are many reasons as to why an individual will donate to a religious institution, and without 
expressly stating such reasons it is often seen as the donor’s right to donate in whatever manner they 
see fit. However, it is argued that some forms of donating or gifting, which are compulsory, have the 
potential to indicate undue influence. Furthermore, adults at risk who are experiencing or are at risk 
of experiencing abuse and who cannot protect themselves need to be supported in making a decision 
to donate. The scope and focus of this paper is on religious institutions, however, the concepts could 
easily be applied to other institutions and organisations.
The law in England and Wales is clear on what undue influence is, although in practice it is very difficult 
to prove when persuasion turns into coercion. Therefore, such claims are not likely to succeed unless 
there is clear evidence indicating that an individual has been coerced into gifting. Religious institutions 
need to be provided with case studies and clear examples of what is and is not deemed to be 
acceptable forms of fundraising so that they can be vigilant and ensure that such donations and gifts 
are not set aside. 
It is suggested that guidance and support ought to come from the Charity Commission. This would 
provide a single point of reference for all charities, including religious institutions who could protect 
themselves from challenges to gifts made, and/or be held accountable if they fell short of the 
requirements. 
Where undue influence has taken place, it is perhaps inappropriate to rely solely on the individual to 
raise their concerns to a third party, particularly with regards to an adult at risk who is unlikely to raise 
their concerns directly. By its very nature, undue influence is exertion of undue pressure, or coercion 
on an individual who is unlikely to feel that they can raise concerns without adverse consequences. 
Therefore, in order to tackle this issue, and to protect adults at risk, more emphasis needs to be placed 
on religious institutions implementing safeguarding policies to protect both donors and themselves 
from challenges to gifts made.
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